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One psychologist refers to the theories generated 
by the concept of cognitive balance as paradigms for 
the «principle of consistency» (Brown, 1962). This 
consistency principle posits that an individual be­
haves so as to maximize the structural balance within 
his cognitive system. The principle derives essen­
tially from Heider’s formulation (1944, 1946) that a 
person (P) tends to keep his sentiments regarding 
another person (O) in line with their mutual evalua­
tion of an object (X), forming the so-called P-O-X 
triad.
As one writer (Zajonc, 1954) notes, Heider’s ba­
lance concept «assumes that social perception 
obeys Gestalt-like dynamics» (p. 339). The basic 
assumption is that cognitive units (e. g., a P-O-X 
triadic social structure) can be classified in «steady» 
or «unsteady» states, and that these cognitive units 
seek steady states. Steady states, further, are deter­
mined by the dynamic character (positive or negative) 
of the elements of a cognitive unit. For example, one 
may view person P negatively and another person 
O positively, expressing the dynamic character of P 
and O. When all elements of a unit are of the same 
sign, a steady state (or cognitive balance) is said to 
exist. Hence P+ and 0+ are taken together without 
«cognitive strain» (viz., in a balanced manner) and 
P+, O— are perceived as unbalanced. These relation­
ships express the Gestalt notions of cohesive and 
restraining forces, respectively.
The aspect of a cognitive unit which the balance 
phenomenon deals with is attitude. Attitudes can be 
reflected in unit relationships, Heider proposes, of 
two kinds: sentiment and unit. A sentiment rela­
tionship is one in which person P likes or dislikes 
another person, O (PL+ O, PL—O), or in which P 
or O like or dislike a third person, some issue, or 
some object (PL+ X, PL—X; OL+X, OL—X). A 
unit relationship is symbolized by U: PU+X, OU_X 
(P has a dog, O does not have a dog). In transi­
tion from the earlier work on the perception of 
causality (1944), Heider changed some fundamental 
nomenclature, so that after his first statement of 
cognitive balance theory as such (1946), there 
arose some confusion as to the distinction between 
sentiment and unit relationships. Subsequent theo­
retical and empirical elaborations make no real
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distinction between the two unit types, therefore.
In terms of the P-O-X triadic relationships, ba­
lance theory makes a statement of the following 
order: When three relationships in a triad are posi­
tive or when two of the relationships are negative 
and one is positive, the triad is balanced.
Balanced :
1. PL+O, PL+X, OL+X
Joe likes Pete and both Joe and Pete like cars.
2. PL-O, PL+X, OL-X or PL“0, PL~X, OL+X 
Joe does not like Pete; Joe likes cars; Pete does 
not like cars. Or, Joe does not like Pete; 
Joe does not like cars; Pete does like cars.
Unbalanced :
1. PL+O, PL-X, OL+X or PL+O, PL+X, OL“X 
Joe likes Pete; Joe does not like cars; Pete likes
cars.
Or, Joe likes Pete; Joe likes cars; Pete does not 
like cars.
2. PL-O, PL+X, OL+X
Joe does not like Pete; both Joe and Pete like 
cars.
In short, depending on the saliency of the object 
of agreement or disagreement, one tends to dislike 
those with whom he disagrees (or disagree with those 
whom he dislikes) and to like those with whom he 
agrees (or agree with those whom he likes).
We have used both the concepts of «tendency» 
and disposition (cognitive units seek steady states) 
to describe the balance phenomenon. Heider more 
accurately conceived of balance in terms of prefer­
ences (1958, pp. 204-205). The nature of this 
preference is unclear. There is no claim for some 
noxious state in the absence of consistency (as in the 
cognitive dissonance formulation), discounting any 
claims as to its having direct drive-like properties. 
The closest parallel to the forces which prompt 
balance preferences is the Gestalt forces towards 
«good forms» in object perception. So, while one 
cannot derive a drive state analog of the balance 
disposition, he can state that, according to Heider, 
social perception is mediated by a consistency prin­
ciple, the consequences of which form the attitudinal 
array dichotomized above as balance and imbalance, 
and that this array is a more or less universal at­
tribute of such perception.
Subsequent extensions of Heider’s work, New­
comb (1953), Cartwright and Harary (1956), Abelson 
and Rosenberg (1958), and others, shifted the em­
phasis of cognitive balance to interpersonal and 
intrapersonal relationships viewed as cognitive dynam­
ics in which the focus is primarily on change. 
Nonetheless, the basic notion remains: that every 
person is bound by some preference in social per­
ception such that he will maintain a maximum degree 
of consistency (or like dynamic alignment—positive 
or negative) between his beliefs and inter-, intraper­
sonal bonds.
Supporting empirical evidence. Most early empirical 
studies testing Heider’s theory of an underlying 
disposition towards cognitive balance asked the 
subject to play the rôle of some hypothetical person 
and supply the missing bond in a triadic unit. Jordan 
(1953), for example, asked subjects to imagine 
themselves as some P who liked O and maintained, 
vis-a-vis O, some relationship with X. The Jordan 
study generally supported Heider’s notion as meas­
ured by the experimental subject’s self-reported pre­
ference for balanced triadic social structures. Ho­
rowitz, Lyons, and Perlmutter (1951) demonstrated 
that evaluation of some event was dependent on 
the relationship between an experimental subject 
and the originator of the event, following the pre­
dictions of balance theory. A study by Festinger and 
Hutte (1954) established that the balance effect 
held for both American and Low Country subjects, 
leading Heider (1958) to conclude that the balance 
phenomenon is «independent of cultural differences» 
(p. 209).
Divergent empirical findings. In 1957, Osgood, Suci, 
and Tannenbaum proposed that the preference for 
balanced states is characteristic of persons with low 
intelligence and little education. Scott (1963) con­
tends that persons whom he characterized as «less 
cognitively complex» have a more pronounced need 
for cognitive consistency. Osgood (1960) found that 
the tolerance of cognitive /«consistency increased 
with intelligence and decreased with heightened 
emotion. What these studies suggest is that, while 
balance preferences may mediate social perception, 
they are by no means a universal perceptual dispo­
sition.
Several studies, moreover, seem to link age 
and sex variables to the would-be balance disposi­
tion. Wolf (1961), Gonzalez (1972), and Gonzalez 
and Maxwell (1973) demonstrated that the tendency 
to balance attitudes is a function of age. In a study of 
sex differences in the disposition towards cog­
nitive balance by Gonzalez (1974), male and female 
students at Princeton University were administered 
a P-O-X triadic social structure. Attitudinal and 
interpersonal sentiments were evaluated along four 
dimensions. Of the four test items, one entailed an 
unspecified relationship between P and O. In a second 
item, the interpersonal relationship indicated was 
between P and the father. Item three directed P to 
relate to a teacher whom he disliked, and the final
209
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item (4) designated a conflict between P and a teacher 
on some issue X.
Subjects in the study were instructed to indicate 
the dynamic character (positive or negative) between 
the various personal units in the triad and issue X. 
Significant differences were found across the sex 
factor for two of the four items, with greater evidence 
for the balance effect among male subjects than among 
female subjects. Female subjects also showed signif­
icantly less disposition towards balanced triads 
in the total number of structures completed. Per­
centages of balanced triads by sex and item type are 
presented in Table 1. Statistical significance for 
differences was established by a z test for differences 
between proportions, with alpha levels indicated in the 
table of means.
I
TABLE 1. Percentage of Balanced P-O-X Triadic Socia 
Structures by Item Type and Sex of Subjects
Subject Sex
Item Female Male
1 76.7% 89.3%
2 96.4 92.9
*3 66.7 100.0
**4 63.3 93.7
** Mean% 75.4 93.7
across all 
items
*p <.05
**p <.oi
Note: Task items represent repeated measures within each level of the 
factor sex, with n at each level = approximately to 30 subjects.
Cross-cultural perspectives. With the exception 
of the results offered by Festinger and Hutte’s 
(1954) study in support of the balance hypothesis, 
the scant literature available seems to suggest that 
the balance effect does not have cross-cultural 
predictive value. Since anthropologists have often 
noted that, within some cultures, members may 
entertain logically incompatible cognitions with no 
apparent pressure to reconcile their beliefs (see 
Osgood and Tannenbaum, 1955), these suggestions 
should come as no surprise. Moreover, the implica­
tions for further qualification—beyond those apro­
pos of age and sex variables—of the theoretical struc­
ture of cognitive balance are extremely important.
Two major studies of the cross-cultural appli­
cation of cognitive balance were done between Greek 
and North American sample populations. The first 
of these studies (Khokhlov and Gonzalez, 1973) 
tested the balance notion across a number of items 
in the two populations. Three age subgroups were 
formed across the Greek and American samples: 
high school, 17-18 years of age; college, with an
210
age range of 19-25; and a subgroup of college 
graduates, 25-28 years old. Within the statistical 
constraints of the cultural and age groups, the 
selection of fifteen individuals in each group was 
random.
Aside from inoperative «dummy» items to pro­
vide a check on the subjects’ understanding of the 
questionnaire, three balance tasks were presented. 
All items recorded responses on a composite scale 
with polarity signs and a vector of numerical values 
from 1 to 5. The subject thus indicated whether his 
assessment of a cognition was positive or negative 
and the intensity of that assessment.
The first item, the task «friend,» in a classical 
balance paradigm, asked the subject (P) to assess his 
relationship to an unspecified acquaintance (O). The 
subject was then presented with a hypothetical posi­
tive relationship to a third person, a friend (X); 
i.e., PL+X. His acquaintance (O) was noted as having 
made a negative response to the same third person 
(X); i.e., OL—X. In the testing question, the subject 
was asked to repeat or, if applicable, re-assess his 
attitude towards his acquaintance (O) on the basis 
of the conflicting or discrepant situation.
The second item, task «father,» repeated the same 
paradigm, but the key person (O) was now the sub­
ject’s father and the third person (X) his or her 
friend.
The third item utilized the concept «country.» 
Subjects were asked to assess their feelings towards 
their country. They were then presented with the 
hypothetical event, that their country had just at­
tacked an innocent nation. Subsequent attitudes 
towards the country were then tested as in other 
items.
An analysis of variance of scores on the items 
before (BD) the introduction of the conflict or 
discrepancy situation and when the subjects were in 
discrepancy (ID) yielded significant differences be­
tween cultures and age groups on various tasks 
for BD and ID scores. Changes between the two 
scores represent a re-assessment of attitudes in the 
face of discrepancy and consequent support for the 
consistency principle.
The pattern of responses for Greek and American 
subjects by task type and mean assessment scores 
before and in discrepancy is graphically presented 
in Figure 1. The effect of the discrepancy situation 
(or the strength of the balance effect) is represented 
as a depressing factor which reduces the mean scores 
from BD to ID. It is obvious that the balance effect 
is significant in the Greek cultural group only for 
the task country, reflected in the significant interac­
tion for task type by cultural group.
While there was no effect for the age variable 
in the Greek population, the American sample
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differed in responses by age, in keeping with the 
findings of the previous studies reported. Figure 2 
graphically represents the ID scores for Greek 
and American subjects by age subgroup collapsed 
across tasks. The variation in responses by age in 
the American cultural group, as opposed to the 
Greek population, is immediately apparent.
In order to render the data in terms of a classical 
designation of balance as an absolute change in 
polarity, rather than as the more discrete scaled 
effect treated by the analysis of variance, responses 
were also assessed by treating sign change only. 
Results, distributed by age and task, appear in Table 2. 
The balanced triad represents a response by sign 
realignment and the unbalanced triad reflects no
TABLE 2. Number of Balanced Triads by Age Group 
and Task
Balance
Tasks, culture Balanced Unbalan- Probability theory
and age groups triads ced triads under H0 support
Task «Friend»
Americans : 
High School 12 3 .018 yes
College 13 2 .004 yes
Post-college 
Greeks :
12 3 .018 yes
High School 0 15 1.000 no
College 0 15 1.000 no
Post-college 0 15 1.000 no
Task «Father»
Americans : 
High Sschool 11 4 .059 no
College 13 2 .004 yes
Post-college 
Greeks :
7 8 .696 no
High School 0 15 1.000 no
College 1 14 .999 no
Post-college 0 15 1.000 no
Task «Country»
Americans : 
High School 10 5 .151 no
College 12 3 .018 yes
Post-college 
Greeks :
0 15 1.000 no
High Sschool 2 13 .996 no
College 2 13 .996 no
Post-college 10 5 .151 no
All tasks
Americans : 
High School 33 12 .018 yes
College 38 7 .001 yes
Post-college 
Greeks :
19 26 .197 no
High School 2 43 1.000 no
College 3 42 1.000 no
Post-college 10 35 .999 no
change in polarity. The third column in Table 2 
indicates the distribution of balanced and unbalanced 
triads as recorded in columns 1 and 2, tested non- 
parametrically for H0. Evidence of support or the 
lack of support for balance theory appears in col­
umn 4 of the table.
The second cross-cultural study to examine the 
balance effect across American and Greek sample 
populations (Gonzalez and Davis, 1974), constituted 
a replication, in part, and extension of the work of 
Gonzâlez and Khokhlov. The purpose was to test 
the two populations along a sex factor for a single 
age group (16-18 years of age). Ina 2X2X2 factorial 
design, the responses of male and female Greek and 
American subjects were assessed both before (BD) 
and in (ID) a discrepancy situation. The task or 
item types remained identical to those in the earlier 
study (Khokhlov and Gonzalez, 1973), though a 
slightly different scaling technique was employed: 
Rather than indicate affect polarity by a sign value, 
subjects were instructed to record their feelings 
along a 10-point adjectival vector with bipolar di­
mensions ranging from «dislike» (1) to «like» (10).
Mean responses were analyzed by item type, sex 
of the subject, nationality of the subject, and the 
discrepancy situation. For the discrepancy factor, a 
lower assessment in the ID condition reflects an 
attempt by the subject to align his feelings in the 
initial BD condition with the intervening discrepant 
information. The mean scores appear in Table 3.
TABLE 3. Mean Attitude Scores Before (BD) and In (ID) 
Discrepancy Situation
Sex and Nationality
Task Type
Greek American
BD ID BD ID
Friend
Male 9.50 7.75 9.13 4.00
Female 9.75 9.75 9.88 5.25
Father
Male 9.88 9.75 9.38 6.25
Female 10.00 9.88 9.88 9.38
Country
Male 9.88 9.75 7.38 2.38
Female 10.00 10.00 9.63 6.13
Note: N = 8 subjects per cell.
A separate analysis of variance was performed 
for each item in a split-plot factorial design (sub­
ject sex by nationality of subject split across the 
discrepancy situation), with repeated measures at
211
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the two sub-levels of the discrepancy situation fac­
tor. Tukey’s q ratio was employed as a comparison 
test for differences between cell means in the internal 
analysis of the ANOVA model, with all reported q 
ratios exceeding the critical q and q values at the .01 
alpha level.
TABLE 4. Summary of the Analysis of Variance of Attitude 
Scores—Task Friend
Source df MS F
Subject sex (A) 1 18.06 17.07**
Nationality (C) 1 72.25 68.29**
A X C 1 0.63 0.06
Error 28 1.06
Discrepancy situation (B) 1 132.25 204.30**
A X B 1 5.06 7.82*
B X C 1 64.00 98.87**
A X B X C 1 1.56 2.14
Error 28 0.65
*p < .01
**p < .001
TABLE 5. Summary of the Analysis of Variance of Attitude 
Scores—Task Father
Source df MS F
Subject sex (A) 1 15.02 46.39*
Nationality (C) 1 21.39 66.09*
A X C 1 11.39 35.19*
Error 28 0.32
Discrepancy situation (ΒΊ 1 15.02 34.15*
A X B 1 6.89 15.67*
B X C 1 11.39 25.90*
A X B X C 1 6.89 15.67*
Error 28 0.44
*p < .001
TABLE 6. Summary of the Analysis of Variance of Attitudg 
Scores—Task Country
Source df MS F
Subject sex (A) 1 40.64 43.04*
Nationality (C) 1 199.52 211.31*
A X C 1 31.64 33.51*
Error 28 0.94
Discrepancy situation fB) 1 74.39 57.17*
A X B 1 2.64 2.03
B X C 1 70.14 53.89*
A X B X C 1 1.89 1.45
Error 28 1.30
*p < .001
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The summary analyses of variance for the three 
test items, «friend,» «father,» and «country,» appear 
in Tables 4, 5, and 6 above. In all three tasks there 
were significant effects for subject sex, nationality 
of subject, and the discrepancy situation, with sig­
nificant two-way interactions for sex and nationality 
on all but task «friend.» There were significant 
two-way interactions for discrepancy and nationality 
on all three items, and a significant two-way interac­
tion for sex and discrepancy in tasks «friend» and 
«father.» The three-way interaction for sex, discrep­
ancy and nationality was significant only for the 
task «father.»
On item 1, task «friend,» significant BD-ID dif­
ferences (i. e., consistency effects) were found only 
for Greek males (q = 5.37), female Americans (q = 
14.20), and male Americans (q = 15.57), differing 
in magnitude from least to greatest balance in that 
order. There were no significant differences in orig­
inal BD scores among all groups. In ID scores, 
American males (q = 9.95) differed from American 
females, as did Greek males (q — 6.22) from Greek 
females, reflecting an overall effect for subject 
sex.
For item 2, task «father,» there was a balance 
effect only for American males (q — 14.29), with 
significant BD score differences only between Amer­
ican males and Greek females (q = 4.37), suggesting 
that only American males re-assessed their affect 
for the father in the face of a discrepant situation.
American males and females showed the only 
BD-ID attitude change on item 3, task «country,» 
(iq — 13.37 and 9.35, respectively), with less attitude 
change among female subjects. It is interesting to 
note that, while Greek males and females did not 
differ in initial assessments of their country, Ameri­
can males and females reported divergent BD sco­
res (q = 9.29), as well as significantly different ID 
scores (q — 15.49). Furthermore, in the American 
sample, the degree of attitude shift (balance) was more 
pronounced in the American male subjects (5 and 
3.5 points, respectively). The unusual implications is 
that American males are more likely to derogate their 
country for an apparently negative act than are Amer­
ican females, and that Greek subjects do not re­
assess their attitudes towards country in the face of 
presumably discrepant or inconsistent intervening 
factors.
These two studies taken together seriously ques­
tion the cross-cultural application of cognitive bal­
ance. The single case for the effect in a Greek 
sample population in the first study seems to be task 
and age specific (post-college subjects in assessing 
the task «country»), and then only on a discrete scale 
which ignores the classical definition of cognitive bal- 
lance as a change of affect polarity. In the second
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study, the only evidence for cognitive balance is 
among Greek males on the task «friend» (though 
admittedly the study considers only a single age 
subgroup).
Theoretical implications The studies reviewed sug­
gest two distinct avenues of interpretation. The first, 
which is by far the more benign in its treatment of 
the consistency principle, stresses the qualifying 
nature of these findings. Certainly, in regard to the 
balance phenomenon, the suggestion is that its theo­
retical structure should place greater emphasis on the 
age, sex, and cultural variables which contribute to 
the saliency of cognitions as they interact in the 
classical P-O-X triad. Following such a suggestion, 
one might view the failure to find a balance effect 
among Greek subjects in the two cross-cultural 
studies reported as a mere artifact of an array of 
cognitions (i. e., a set of tasks) which inadequately 
replicate the consistency principle in the Greek 
culture. That is to say, while the matrix of cognitions 
utilized did not elicit balanced responses, there 
exists the possibility that, in other matrices of inter­
acting cognitions, the balance phenomenon is oper­
ative. By the same token, age and sex variables 
within a single culture may interact with a given set of 
cognitions such that balance is either attenuated or 
absent.
The limitations of such an avenue of interpreta­
tion are obvious. If, indeed, the consistency prin­
ciple is a function of the appropriate interaction of 
sex and age variables with an ideal matrix of cogni­
tions at some time T out of the set of temporal con­
ditions Tn, is it parsimonious to refer to the princi­
ple as a universal «cognitive preference»? Moreover, 
at least in a cross-cultural sense, can one seriously 
defend a phenomenon which bases its functionality, 
not on observed data, but on the eventuality of its 
discovery in future research? It is seldom that ubi­
quity is established on the anticipated exception 
taken as the paradigm case.
A course of interpretation less kind to the con­
sistency principle asserts that cognitive balance may 
not be a universal trait and that, contrary to Freed­
man (1968), individuals do not always seek logical, 
simplistic, and consistent Weltansichten. In terms of 
the assumptions of modern social psychology (from 
consistency to attribution and person perception 
theories in general), this is a revolutionary statement. 
But the findings reported here do lend it some 
support. Not only do Americans fail to evidence 
consistency effects at all times, but the effects are 
virtually absent in the Greek sample, leading one 
to suspect that the latter can accept and assimilate 
ambiguity and imbalance in their sentimental rela­
tionships without pejorative consequences and ap­
parently without violating some preferential percep­
tual mechanism.
In terms of the American evidence for consisten­
cy, it is interesting to note that most of the studies 
in social psychology in North America draw on an 
experimental pool of undergraduate college or 
university students and, as a rule, among psychology 
majors. In the specific case of cognitive balance 
studies, the American undergraduate student, as 
an experimental subject, may tend excessively to 
align his attitudes and balance his cognitions on 
the basis of supportive beliefs gleaned either from 
notions of a traditional decision pattern peculiar to 
his social formation or from his expectations about 
the social psychological model of «man the consis­
tent organism.» Tedeschi, Schlenker, and Bonoma 
(1971) point out that researchers in social science 
often ignore the extent to which they might be mani­
pulated by students as a result of these circumstan­
ces. Vivid support of this alternative explanation is 
presented in Table 2, where support for the balan­
ce effect is overwhelmingly accounted for by the 
American college-age group.
The authors strongly suggest that some effort 
be expended in the replication of the findings reported. 
Despite attempts to vary method, analysis, and 
cognitive units in these and other studies in prepara­
tion, the results thus far remain consistent. They 
pose a strong possibility that the assumption of a 
universally operative model of cognitive consistency 
as an irresistible tendency to resolve cognitive im­
balance by an automatic adjustment of attitudes may 
be a cultural, experimental, or, as a result of its 
inadequate formulation, a theoretical artifact. We 
are left with a greater impression of the seriousness 
in which an old Spanish aphorism asserts that «a 
man who does not contradict himself may have 
nothing to say.»
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